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Abstract
Creative cognitive systems are rarely assessed with
the same tools as human creativity. In this pa-
per, a general approach is proposed for building
more such comparable systems. The importance
of using cognitively viable processes, cognitive
knowledge and evaluation when implementing cre-
ative problem-solving systems is emphasized. Two
case studies of artificial cognitive systems evalu-
ated with human creativity tests are reviewed. A
general approach is put forward. The applicabil-
ity of this general approach to other creativity tests
and artificial cognitive systems, together with ways
of performing cognitive knowledge acquisition for
these systems are then explored.
1 Introduction
Imagine you are in your house, needing to solve a particular
problem which involves specific objects. You need a partic-
ular tool, object (e.g. a piece of string) or recipe ingredient
(e.g. mince meat), but you don’t have it in the house. You
would like to solve your problem using a different tool, object
or ingredient, and have a system show you what you could
use instead (e.g. dental floss to replace the piece of string,
aubergine to replace the mince meat - depending on task and
recipe context).
Or envision a situation in which you ran out of ideas on
how to solve a particular problem. You feel stuck and would
like to think of a different approach. You would like the help
of a system that could inspire you, operating in a cognitive
manner, and showing you items (websites, research articles,
excerpts from encyclopedias, music, films, photos, formulas)
which could trigger for you new associations, new ways of
solving that problem.
Such assistive systems would need to be capable of cre-
ative problem-solving and of presenting their results in a man-
ner that can easily be used as input by humans. They would
need to be endowed with cognitive knowledge acquisition,
and types of knowledge processing which are akin to those
used by humans in their creative problem-solving.
Computational creativity is a strongly emerging field in Ar-
tificial Intelligence, with application systems ranging from
poetry [Colton et al., 2012] and painting [Colton, 2012] to
mathematics [Lenat, 1976].Empirical tests of human creativ-
ity and creative problem-solving do exist. However, compu-
tational creativity systems can rarely be assessed in a compa-
rable manner, i.e. by using human creativity tests. This has
as consequence the fact that not many artificial cognitive sys-
tems which can be used as cognitive models exist (e.g. [He´lie
and Sun, 2010]), and thus not as much progress is made as it
could be in terms of understanding the cognitive bases of the
creative process, and in building artificial cognitive creative
systems.
This paper argues that (i) artificial cognitive systems can
be used to shed light on the human creative process and (ii)
knowledge obtained from creativity tests can be used to in-
form and evaluate artificial cognitive systems, if more work
is done on artificial cognitive systems which can be assessed
with human creativity tests. To support this claim, this pa-
per presents two case studies of systems which can solve hu-
man creativity tests, briefly describing how cognitive knowl-
edge was acquired and organized for such systems, the pro-
cesses used and how the systems where evaluated compared
to their human counterparts. A general approach for building
more such systems for other creative tasks is presented, to-
gether with the types of knowledge, knowledge acquisition,
processes and types of evaluation which can be used. The
benefits of bridging this gap are then shown in terms of (a)
new relations which can be observed or studied from a cogni-
tive modeling paradigm and (b) knowledge and data obtained
from human creativity tests which can then be used to inform
artificial cognitive systems.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section
2 describes the differences between computational creativity
evaluation methods and human creative evaluation. Cogni-
tive processes relevant when implementing artificial creative
cognitive systems are discussed in Section 3. Sections 4.1
and 4.2 briefly describe two case studies of artificial cogni-
tive systems which can give comparable results to humans in
creativity tests, together with the knowledge acquisition, cog-
nitive processing and evaluation of these systems. Section 5
presents a general approach when aiming to make artificial
cognitive systems yield comparable results to humans in cre-
ativity tests. The applicability of this approach to other cre-
ativity tests is discussed in Section 6. A short description of
how cognitive knowledge acquisition can be performed using
creativity tests is provided in section 7. A short discussion
and conclusion is presented in Section 8.
2 Computational creativity evaluation versus
human creativity tests
Computational creativity is evaluated in various ways and it
has been debated what the evaluation process for computa-
tional creativity systems should be [Wiggins, 2001; Ritchie,
2001]. Some authors aim to produce artefacts through their
systems, and would like them to be assessed as having com-
parable creativity as that of humans. Others define creativity
in terms of process [Boden, 2003], not aiming for an imple-
mentation. Ritchie [2001] proposed an assessment of com-
putational creative systems which takes into account the in-
spiring set – a union of implicit and explicit knowledge –
formalizing fourtheen criteria of evaluation, centered around
typicality, quality and novelty. Pease, Winterstein and Colton
[2001] proposed an evaluation which takes into account the
input, output and process of the creative system, based on
measures of novelty, quality and process. The FACE model
[Colton et al., 2011] describes creative acts as tuples of gen-
erative acts, including items and methods of producing items
in four categories: concepts, concept expressions, aesthetic
measures and framing information. The IDEA model [Colton
et al., 2011] uses the notion of impact a creation has, rather
than that of creation value, and suggests six stages of devel-
opment of a computational creativity system, based on the
difference between the information given as knowledge to the
system and the artefacts it generates. Other authors use hu-
man evaluation (e.g. Williams and McOwan [2014]), asking
users to rate the products of computational creativity systems,
or to choose words which appropriately describe their reac-
tion to those products.
Though the field of computational creativity evaluation has
made significant progress, none of these types of evaluation
shines a bright light on cognitive creative processing.
On the other hand, human creative problem-solving or pro-
cesses considered to take part in it (like divergent thought) are
evaluated with various tasks. Some of these are the following:
• The Remote Associates Test [Mednick and Mednick,
1971];
• The Alternative Uses Test [Guilford, 1967];
• The Torrance Creativity Tests (reviewed by Kim
[2006]);
• The Wallach-Kogan test [Wallach and Kogan, 1965];
• Insight tests [Maier, 1931; Duncker, 1945]
The human responses in such tasks are generally evaluated
in terms of various groups of the following metrics. Some
of these metrics assess a particular expected correct answer,
others are used for assessing open-ended answers.
1. achieving or not achieving a solution (this metric is par-
ticularly useful for hard insight tasks);
2. response time for a particular solution;
3. difficulty of solving a particular problem item as a per-
centage of the population solving it;
4. fluency - in open-ended tests, measures how many dif-
ferent items the participant has come up with as an an-
swer);
5. flexibility - measures how many semantically different
domains the answers to a particular item cover;
6. elaboration - assesses the amount of detail contained in
the various answers;
7. originality - responses given by a small percentage of the
participants are rated as unusual;
8. novelty - human judges are asked to assess answers
given by human participants on a novelty scale (used for
the Alternative Uses Test [Guilford, 1967], the Wallach-
Kogan test [Wallach and Kogan, 1965]). One can then
check for the validity of the novelty judgement by ex-
ploring the agreement between the assessments of the
various judges.
Furthermore, the literature addressing these tests sheds in-
sight into the cognitive processing behind such tasks.
3 The importance of cognitive processing in
creative problem-solving systems
Various cognitive processes are said to account for cre-
ative problem-solving, with one of the most modeled pro-
cesses being analogy (with models like ANALOGY [Evans,
1964], MAC/FAC [Forbus et al., 1995], LISA [Hummel and
Holyoak, 1997], STAR [Halford et al., 1994], Copycat [Hofs-
tadter et al., 1994], etc.). Another creative process which has
recently gathered investigative interest is that of conceptual
blending [Fauconnier and Turner, 1998]. Various theories ac-
count for insight problem-solving [Batchelder and Alexander,
2012]. In order to build artificial cognitive creative agents,
one can use this literature to build computational mechanisms
akin to the cognitive processes involved in solving creative
tasks. In the author’s opinion [Oltet¸eanu, 2014], the cogni-
tive processes of association, use of similarity, structure, and
re-representation are to be always kept in mind.
Associations are important in creative problem-solving
due to their ability to bring new material into the problem
space for the solver. Creative problem spaces are ambiguous
and therefore can benefit from fluidity. Associations can eas-
ily be made based on similarity or context. Associations can
be made by context, as encountering certain items (a, b, c, d)
constantly together, generally produces the cognitive result of
triggering the other items (c, d) when some of the items (a, b)
have been shown. Associations can be made by similarity,
as similarity of features might imply similarity of affordance
(e.g. if you know you can kick footballs, you might want
to try playing in the same way with any spherical object of
similar weight and material).
All such processes can help bring more useful items into
the problem space and allow re-representation. Knowl-
edge of structure can allow structure-mapping into differ-
ent domains [Gentner, 1983], replacement of structure parts
[Oltet¸eanu and Falomir, 2015b], navigation between similar
structures, and structure-based operations (merging, overlap,
removal of unnecessary parts, etc.)[Oltet¸eanu, 2014]. This al-
lows further ways of using old knowledge creatively in order
to produce new, useful and interesting knowledge.
Such cognitive processes need to be replicated in artificial
cognitive systems in order to: a) enable them to assist the hu-
mans in processes of re-representation and creative problem-
solving, and b) explain their own creative productions in ways
which make sense to humans. An initial requirement in repli-
cating and refining such processes is the ability to build sys-
tems capable to give results comparable to humans in various
creativity tests.
4 Case studies
This section summarizes two case studies of cognitive sys-
tems which yield results comparable to human participants
in human creativity tests. Section 4.1 presents the human
Remote Associates Test and a cognitive system which can
give comparable answers from the literature [Oltet¸eanu and
Falomir, 2015a]. Section 4.2 presents the Alternative Uses
Test and a system capable of giving similar answers to hu-
mans to this test [Oltet¸eanu and Falomir, 2015b].
4.1 Case 1 - A Remote Associates Test solver
This section reviews: (i) the Remote Associates Test, (ii) the
cognitive knowledge acquisition and process of the computa-
tional solver and (iii) the evaluation with human data.
The Remote Associates Test
The Remote Associates Test (RAT) by Mednick and Mednick
[1971] is a creativity test in which participants are given three
word items and required to produce a fourth, which is asso-
ciates with all three of them in some way. For example, the
words CREAM, SKATE and WATER are given. A correct an-
swer to this query would be the word ICE. Various types of
RAT can be distinguished, depending on the type of associa-
tions at play [Worthen and Clark, 1971].
The RAT has been widely used as an empirical measure-
ment of creativity [Ansburg, 2000; Dorfman et al., 1996]
and translated into multiple languages [Baba, 1982; Hamil-
ton, 1982; Nevo and Levin, 1978; Chermahini et al., 2012].
The type of data acquired after empirical testing includes
the percentage of participants solving a particular test item
and response speed. Response times for different amounts
of allocated solving time have been obtained in the literature
(for 7s, 15s, 30s), with useful sources of normative data being
available [Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003].
Description of the knowledge acquisition and process for
the artificial cognitive system solver
A computational RAT solver (comRAT) was presented in the
literature by Oltet¸eanu and Falomir [2014; 2015a], using lan-
guage data and a convergence process, which will be fur-
ther briefly summarized. The language data used consisted
of the 1, 048, 720 most frequent 2-grams from the Corpus
of Contemporary American English1. Using the UCREL
CLAWS7 Tagset2, only 205, 602 2-grams with relevant tags
1http://corpus.byu.edu/coca/
2http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/claws7tags.html
for the task were kept. The comRAT system learned all
the unique Concepts of the 2-grams, and organized bidirec-
tional Links between Concepts which appeared together in
an Expression.
When 3-word RAT queries were given to the system, if
known, the 3 Concepts were activated, together with the
Links and Concepts attatched to them. The Concepts acti-
vated from most sides were considered as potential answers.
The activation of the initial Concepts thus converged upon
possible answers for RAT queries.
Description of evaluation with human data
The comRAT system was given the 144 items from the Bow-
den and Jung-Beeman [2003] normative data to solve, thus
being tested with the exact same queries as humans. With-
out using any frequency data, the computational RAT found
the correct answer provided in the normative data for 47 out
of the 48 items for which it had known all 3 initial Expres-
sion items. The system solved another 17 queries for which
it only knew 2 initial items. For another more than 20 cases,
the system came up with other plausible answers, which were
not identical to the correct answers provided by the normative
data.
Using frequency data, the probability of the system to find
an answer has been found to correlate with the difficulty of
the RAT queries for humans. Difficulty of query for humans
was understood to be represented in the normative data by hu-
man response time and percentage of participants solving the
query. A significant moderate correlation between difficulty
of query for humans and comRAT’s probability of finding an
answer was observed.
The authors mention that the comRAT solver can be used
to generate new RAT queries. RAT for human participants
can thus be generated controlling for semantic tag, position in
the 2-gram of the given and answer word, frequency. Some
of these queries can have multiple possible answers. In this
case, data about probability of answer from the computational
system can be used to check whether (i) answer preference in
humans is due consistently to a higher frequency of the query
item-answer pair, or (ii) appreciation for a particular answer
is higher when the frequency is lower.
4.2 Case 2 - An Alternative Uses Test solver
This section reviews: (i) the Alternative Uses Test, (ii) the
knowledge organization and process of the computational
solver and (iii) the evaluation of the system, comparable to
evaluation of human answers to the Alternative Uses Test.
The Alternative Uses Test
The Alternative Uses Test [Guilford, 1967] takes the follow-
ing form: participants are given the name of an object item
(e.g. Brick), and asked to come up with as many different
uses as they can for that item, in a set amount of time (this
amount varies from an empirical investigation to another -
generally between 1 min and 3 min). Then, the participants
proceed on doing the same with the next item, etc.
The evaluation of the Alternative Uses Test is done on Flu-
ency, Flexibility and Originality or Novelty.
Description of the knowledge acquisition for the artificial
cognitive system solver
An Object Replacement Object Composition (OROC) system
was deemed able to give similar answers as humans to the
Alternative Uses Test [Oltet¸eanu and Falomir, 2015b].
OROC had a knowledge base of 70 simple and 20 com-
posed objects. These objects are described through their
various features (name, material, shape, affordance, size).
Their features were manually encoded from descriptions of
the object, and considered common sense knowledge. OROC
makes creative inferences of similarity of affordance based
on similarity of other features - e.g. if object a has affor-
dance affa, than objects b and c can be proposed as having
the same affordances or being suitable replacements if they
have similar (functional) properties.
Description of evaluation with human data
Five objects from a household items domain were chosen
for OROC to deploy its creative inference of affordance
on. These objects were: Cup, Newspaper, Toothbrush,
Carpet,Dental F loss. Thus, for an object likeCup, OROC
could come up with creative inferences about its affordances,
e.g. A cup can be used for putting flowers in (based on its
similarity of shape with known object V ase).
Fluency and flexibility of OROC’s answers was assessed
in the same manner as for the evaluation of human answers.
Human judges were then employed to assess Novelty, Use-
fulness and Likability on a 1-7 scale. Human judges were
not informed that they were assessing the creative answers of
an artificial system. The most novel, useful and likable items
were thus classified (for example, the alternative use response
judged as demonstrating most novelty was Dental floss may
be used to hang clothes to dry). After evaluation, the system
demonstrated similar ratings as those obtained by answers
given by human participants. As a side result, a correlation
between ratings on Usefulness and Likability was observed
in human judges. More importantly, this evaluation demon-
strated the ability to apply similar techniques in assessing cre-
ative solving by human and artificial cognitive systems.
It is worth noting that OROC was not implemented with
the Alternative Uses Test in mind, but for the general purpose
of being able to replace object a with an object b with similar
functionality when object a was in its KB, but not in the en-
vironment. Part of OROC’s abilities, like that of composing
new objects, remain presently untested via comparison to a
human creativity task counterpart.
5 General Approach
As illustrated in the previous case studies, a general approach
can be formulated for producing artificial cognitive systems
that can yield comparable results to humans in creativity tests.
This approach involves several steps, listed in the follow-
ing:
1. Choosing a human creativity test the results of which
are to be replicated via a cognitive system, or choosing a
creative problem-solving skill that is more general (like
creative object replacement) and has some empirical ad-
jacent validation possible (like the Alternative Uses test
for object replacement as a general skill).
2. Finding a source of knowledge for cognitive knowledge
acquisition. Implementing types of knowledge acquisi-
tion or organization which are cognitively inspired, or
which might yield further cognitive results. For exam-
ple, the OROC solver demonstrates other cognitive ef-
fects, like shape bias [Imai et al., 1994].
3. Implementing a system which uses processes similar to
(or is able to produce results similar to) cognitive cre-
ative processes, like association, re-representation, etc.
4. Using human normative data for that particular test or
general task; obtaining normative data by running that
creativity test if data is not readily available.
5. Evaluating the results of the artificial cognitive system
using: a) human normative data and/or b) evaluation
techniques used for assessing the human creativity task.
6. Deploying data analysis measures which enable new
possible relations of scientific interest to be observed.
7. Enabling the artificial cognitive system with generative
abilities for that particular test or task (if possible). This
will allow for new empirical testing of human partic-
ipants with controlled variables, to further refine hy-
potheses about creative processes.
6 Applicability of these principles to other
creativity tests
In this section, the manner in which the steps of the general
approach have been implemented in the two case studies is
summarized. The steps that can still be implemented are ex-
plained. An analysis of the applicability of these steps to
other creativity tests is performed.
6.1 The RAT solver
The Remote Associates Test [Mednick and Mednick, 1971]
has been previously described (Section 4.1). The ap-
proach steps have been implemented by Oltet¸eanu and
Falomir[Oltet¸eanu and Falomir, 2015a] as follows:
1. Human creativity test used: The Remote Associates
Test.
2. Knowledge used: 2-grams from a human language cor-
pus. Other language corpuses can also be used to check
for scalability. Knowledge acquisition process: Use of a
cognitive framework, Concepts, Links.
3. Cognitively inspired processes: Association based
search, Convergence (as explained in [Oltet¸eanu and
Falomir, 2015a]).
4. Normative data used: Normative data for 144 queries
from Bowden and Jung-Beeman [2003].
5. Evaluation used: ability to respond to the same queries
as the ones in human normative data; correlation be-
tween answer probability and human difficulty.
6. Data analysis measures and observations: correlation
with human difficulty; yet to be empirically tested on
a significant scale: influences of frequency on answer
preference. Possible other mesures: influences of fre-
quency on appreciation of RAT query-answer pair as
more creative.
7. Generative abilities: mentioned as available. Can offer
control over frequency, presentation order of items, etc.
6.2 The Alternative Uses solver system
The Alternative Uses Test [Guilford, 1967] has been previ-
ously described (Section 4.2). The general approach can be
illustrated stepwise for the implementation by Oltet¸eanu and
Falomir [2015b] as follows:
1. Human creativity test used: The Alternative Uses Test.
2. Knowledge used: Object, Object parts and Features
Knowledge. Knowledge organization process: Anchor-
ing objects (concepts) in feature maps, ordering feature
maps based on feature similarity.
3. Cognitively inspired processes: Similarity-based associ-
ation, structure (transfer), shape bias.
4. Normative data used: Evaluation of human answers to
the Alternative Uses Test by Gilhooly et al [2007].
5. Evaluation used: Fluency and Flexibility; Novelty, Use-
fulness and Likability as assessed by human judges.
Comparability of these ratings to those of human re-
sponses. OROC’s processes were analysed in compar-
ison with the processes used by human participants as
obtained via a think aloud protocol.
6. Data analysis measures and observations: Relation be-
tween Novelty, Usefulness and Likability. Other possi-
ble measures: analysis of different features as driving
human responses via similarity - to be compared with
such features in the system.
7. Generative abilities: possibly available. Could offer
control over various types of feature influence in cre-
ative judgement, to answer questions such as: “Is shape
more often used than material when making creative in-
ferences?”, “Can modifications of shape enable/disable
the creative inference for humans?”, etc.
6.3 The Wallach-Kogan test
The Wallach-Kogan test [1965] gives participants a specific
property or component, and requires them to enumerate as
many items as they can which have that property or contain
that component (e.g. items that are green, that make noise,
that have wheels, etc.). These are possible steps of building
or making comparable an artificial cognitive system:
1. Human creativity test: the Wallach-Kogan test.
2. Knowledge that can be used: Object and Features
Knowledge. Knowledge acquisition process: data from
human descriptions of objects can be parsed for this pur-
pose. Tasks can be given over crowdsourcing platforms
to gather more such data.
3. Cognitively inspired processes: Similarity-based associ-
ation, common parts/structure, feature based search.
4. Normative data can be acquired by giving the Wallach-
Kogan test to human participants, with stimuli consist-
ing of sets of oftenly encountered properties and object
parts. Thus, normative data for flexibility, fluency and
originality of answers can be gathered. Human judges
can be used for novelty and elaboration ratings.
5. Evaluation: Fluency, Flexibility, Novelty, Originality.
6. Data analysis measures and observations: Relationships
between feature access and component access speed, be-
tween speed of access and frequency of property (in
human answers), between Fluency and Novelty ratings,
etc.
7. Generative abilities: can be used to control for frequency
of objects-properties or objects-components relations,
thus helping investigate (i) whether feature based search
and component based search of objects which have those
features and properties are processes with equal or dif-
ferent speed in human participants; (ii) whether different
types of features based queries have are easier or harder
than others; (iii) whether number of components in the
object yielded influences performance, etc.
6.4 Insight tests
Insight tests, like the ones by Maier [1931] and Duncker
[1945] require a larger amount of knowledge and heuristics
in order to be succesfully solved and implemented. Address-
ing insight tests which require object knowledge before those
which require abstract knowledge might be a productive scal-
able strategy.
1. Human creativity test: Object insight tests.
2. Knowledge used: Object knowledge, problem templates
and heuristics. Knowledge acquisition process: knowl-
edge of object properties has already been discussed;
knowledge of object affordances can be acquired in a
similar way. Tasks can be given over crowdsourcing
platforms to acquire affordances of sets of commonly
used objects. Data mining strategies can be used to ex-
tract from text corpora sets of objects with the verbs that
are used in conjunction with them - a subset of which
will constitute the object’s affordances. It is sensible to
consider that at least a subset of the problem templates
which pertain to objects will be constructed from such
affordances.
3. Cognitively inspired processes: Re-representation, cre-
ation of new problem templates, creation of new heuris-
tics.
4. Normative data: Data on object insight tests can be ac-
quired from existing sources [Jacobs and Dominowski,
1981], or via new empirical investigations.
5. Evaluation tools that can be used: comparability to hu-
mans in think aloud protocols, the use/creation of simi-
lar problem templates, knowledge and processes, switch
between templates, escape from functional fixedness.
6. Data analysis measures and observations: problem tem-
plates regularly employed, number of associated objects,
their relation to response times, etc.
7. Generative abilities: control over variables like problem
templates used or heuristics triggered, objects, features.
7 Cognitive knowledge acquisition from
creativity tests
Some human creativity tests can be used to provide knowl-
edge bases for artificial cognitive systems. For example, the
Wallach-Kogan test will yield a set of data pertaining to ob-
ject properties and object parts, as for each property or object
part various objects having that property or that object part
are asked for from the participant.
These answers can be used in the knowledge base of artifi-
cial systems, in the context of other tests - like the Alternative
Uses test - where various properties are required to be known
by the system, or the object insight tests, in which proper-
ties might be relevant for future affordance in solving object
tasks.
Furthermore, common answers in the Wallach-Kogan test
can be considered as high-frequency associates, and models
can be built to interpret the frequency of occuring answers in
the Wallach-Kogan test or their ordering as weigths of asso-
ciative links.
Similarly, giving human participants a set of object-related
insight problems using the think aloud protocol will provide
knowledge on problem templates used (even if some of them
are not productive for that particular problem), from which
observations can be made on how such templates are con-
structed.
8 Discussion
As shown in the previous case studies (Sections 4.1 and 4.2),
this approach is useful from both an Artificial Intelligence and
a cognitive science perspective.
From the AI perspective, new techiques can be developed
out of the inspiration of human creative cognitive processing.
From the cognitive science perspective, these systems can
further be used by cognitive psychologists for the more de-
tailed cognitive modeling of creative tasks, the implemen-
tation and testing of various theoretical hypotheses on how
creative processes proceed and how knowledge organization
sustains such processes.
New relations can be observed during the implementation
of systems capable of comparable results in data analysis,
like the correlation between the probability of finding an an-
swer and the difficulty of query for the (RAT, comRAT) test–
system pair, or the relationship between Usefulness and Lik-
ability in the Alternative Uses Test.
In order to bridge the gap between computational creativity
and empirical research on human creativity, we must aim to
address not only artefact creating systems, but also problem-
solving and creative reasoning systems, and systems which
can give answers comparable to humans in creativity tests.
This will allow the further study of the creative process, in
both artificial and natural cognitive systems.
In conclusion, this paper has presented a general approach
to building cognitive computational creativity systems which
can give comparable answers as humans to human creativity
tests. Two case studies of systems which realize this were
presented. A set of steps was laid down as possible method-
ology when approaching such systems. The application of
these steps to other creativity tests was briefly explored.
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